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Abstract This paper describes some policy instruments set up by the IMF 
and the European Union in order to provide financial assistance to 
developing countries whose economies are affected by exogenous shocks 
from exports side. After briefly reviewing the IMF’s CFF and the EU’s 
STABEX, the paper presents the operational rules of FLEX and 
comments on how it functioned from 2000 to 2007. The analysis shows 
that the FLEX facility suffered from there being inadequate finance 
allocated to ACPs and from delays in the financing procedure. While 
these constraints greatly limited the impact of FLEX in the application 
years 2000-2006, the 2008 FLEX revision eased them and, now, FLEX 
can guarantee financial support more rapidly than in the past and may 
more satisfactorily cover the financial requirements of ACPs coping with 
export earnings instability.      
Keywords: Developing Countries, Export Earnings Instability, Budget 
Support. 
Jel Codes:   F35, O19. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries are still highly vulnerable to changes in the economic 
environment due to exogenous shocks, such as natural disasters (including droughts 
and floods), conflicts/crisis in neighbouring countries or disturbances in the 
international trading system, such as volatility of commodity prices or rises in food 
and oil prices. This high vulnerability of developing countries to shocks is due to 
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usual disclaimer applies. several causes, some of which are related to structural factors that characterise their 
economy. For instance, resilience to shocks is low when an economy depends heavily 
on the production of just a few commodities, the prices of which often show high 
short-term variability and/or a long-run declining trend. How a country reacts to shock 
is also linked to the degree of exposure to the shock itself: the greater the exposure the 
higher the impact of the shock.
2 Other determinants of a country’s vulnerability to 
shocks are the development of financial markets and the functioning and quality of 
institutions. 
Some attempts to use a single index that combines different aspects of 
countries’ vulnerability show that, over the period 1996-2000, low-income countries 
registered the highest values on the vulnerability index and that there was a strong 
negative correlation between vulnerability to exogenous shocks and the level of 
countries’ economic development (Atkins and others 2000; Crowards 1999; United 
Nation 2006). 
As vulnerability to shocks is an influential factor for the growth of developing 
countries [see, among many others, Guillaumont (2005) and Combes and Guillaumont 
(2002)], many efforts have been made to address the issues faced by countries 
affected by exogenous shocks. Experience at the individual country level shows that 
developing economies have a limited capacity to cope with exogenous shocks, even 
when they are temporary. In such a case, timely finance would compensate for losses 
caused by a shock and would help countries to limit the negative impact on growth.  
The main constraints faced by governments of developing countries in dealing 
with the effects of exogenous shocks regard (a) the scarcity and the accessibility of 
finance to be used as compensation for drops in income or as investments to remove 
the cause of vulnerability and/or (b) the opportunity costs of holding back reserves 
and fiscal resources in order to create a self-insurance fund against shocks (Griffith 
and others 2008; Cortes and others 2008, United Nations 2006).
3 
On a global level, the international community has been asked to design 
policies aimed at limiting the negative impacts of exogenous shocks. This paper 
reviews part of the literature relating to the compensatory financing systems which 
have been implemented to help developing countries suffering from shortfalls in 
export earnings. In doing this, it only covers one type of exogenous shock, i.e. the 
short-run variability of export earnings, and only one type of policy dealing with these 
shocks, i.e. financial assistance to countries whose export proceeds have suffered as a 
result of an unforeseen decline in commodity prices and/or in quantity traded. 
Two major schemes were implemented in the past specifically in order to 
stabilise the export earnings of LDCs: the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the STABEX programme laid down in the 
Lomé Convention. These two schemes operate on an ex-post basis and, in this sense, 
are comparable with the “FLEX” facility, which is currently used by the EU to 
provide financial support to ACPs affected by export side shocks. 
                                             
2 Exposure to shocks may be expressed, for instance, in terms of trade-openness or in terms of 
production in climate-dependent sectors, such as agriculture and tourism. 
3 These opportunity costs should also be compared with the opportunity cost of ODA 
mobilised in compensatory facilities versus mitigating actions. The choice to pay attention to “traditional” mechanisms is a consequence of 
the attempt to learn from the lessons drawn from the way they function. These lessons 
help the understanding whether these facilities may still be useful for developing 
countries.  
At least in the very short period, an effective step would appear to be the 
modification of FLEX and similar schemes (e.g., the IMF’s CFF), in order to make 
them more countercyclical. This holds true at a time when the tendency, driven 
mainly by the World Bank, is towards market-friendly alternatives when dealing with 
issues relating to the instability of world markets.
4 
The paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the working of 
IMF’s CFF and EU’ Stabex, respectively. Sections 4 and 5 present an analysis of 
FLEX support from 2000 to 2007. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND’S COMPENSATORY 
FINANCING FACILITY 
The IMF provides financial assistance to its members affected by exogenous shocks 
through a variety of facilities. Among these facilities, a specific role is played by the 
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF), which was set up in 1963, the Stand-by-
Arrangements (SBAs), established in 1952, and by two more recent programmes, the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility 
(ESF) introduced in 1999 and in 2005 respectively. Although all these IMF 
instruments were set up to assist countries experiencing BoP problems, they differ in 
several aspects. One example of this is that they pursue different objectives: the CFF 
explicitly makes the stabilisation of export earnings a central aim, while, for the other 
instruments, it is an implicit by-product.  
In what follows, the working of CFF, and its use by IMF members, will be 
presented and discussed by comparing it with the other IMF lending alternatives. This 
might help understand the role that CFF and similar schemes may play nowadays as 
effective policies addressed at enhancing the economic growth of developing 
countries. 
      
Aims, eligibility requirements and rules of operation for the IMF’s CFF 
The CFF is intended to ensure timely external financing for members experiencing 
BoP difficulties resulting from a temporary decline in export earnings or a temporary 
increase in cereal import costs.
5 The basic idea of the facility is that, when a 
temporary shock to export revenues occurs, the compensating payment allows 
beneficiaries to maintain aggregate demand at pre-shock level and, thus, to avoid the 
likely recessionary impact of a sudden drop in exports, presuming the BoP 
experiences no other problems (on this point, see also Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 
                                             
4 The recent main policy options for export earnings instability have also been reviewed and 
discussed in Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2008), Hewitt (2007), Parimal (2006) and Tabova 
(2005). 
5 From Nov 1990 to Dec 1991, the CFF temporarily provided assistance to oil-dependent 
countries when oil prices rose as a result of the Gulf War (IMF 2003). 2008, page 2). 
In addition to experiencing a BoP problem due to an export earning shortfall 
or excess cereal import costs, the eligibility requirements include the following: 
A.  The shortfall in export earnings or the excess cereal import costs have to be 
temporary, that is they have to be short term in character. 
B.  The shortfall in export earnings or the excess cereal import costs must be 
largely attributable to factors beyond the control of the beneficiary country. 
C.  If the IMF member has BOP difficulties above and beyond the effect of the 
shock, it must have a new arrangement in place at the time of the request for a 
CFF purchase. In other words, “where the BoP is not deemed satisfactory, 
requests for CFF can only be met in conjunction with an upper credit tranche-
type arrangement” (IMF, 2004a, Box 1).  
The last qualifying criterion
6 introduces conditionality in the sense that depend on the 
terms of the arrangement. This implies that only the stand-alone purchases are not 
subject to conditionality, in the sense that requests for stand-alone purchases under 
CFF are met only if the BoP position is satisfactory, apart from the export earnings 
shock (or the excess in cereal import costs). 
The amount that an IMF member can draw is limited by the degree of the 
estimated drop in exports, subject to a quota limit. In other words, compensation may 
be asked for when export proceeds in the application year are below their five-year 
geometric year centred on the shortfall year, and with projections used for the two 
post-shortfall years. Therefore this method for calculating the shortfall requires that 
the export figures in the two years successive to the shock (N+1. N+2) are estimated 
by the IMF in conjunction with the participating country.
7 
The deviation of actual export earnings from the reference value is 
compensated fully if it does not reach the member’s quota limitation. The current 
operating rules of the CFF limit to 45 percent of a member’s quota the amount that 
can be drawn from the facility to compensate for an export shortfall or an increase in 
cereal import costs. This percentage is 55 percent when the shock affects both the 
                                             
6 This qualifying criterion was introduced in 2000 in order to “reduce the need for difficult 
judgments required in the previous system and reflects the need for some adjustment where 
balance of payment problems extend beyond the export shortfall or cereal import excess” 
(IMF, 2004a, page 7). 
7 In the past, the medium-term trend of export earnings was determined by using different 
formulas. For instance, in 1963, the IMF used a mixed method combining (a) the weighted 
average of the last two pre-shock year values (with weight of 0.25) and of the value of the 
application year (with a weight of 0.5) and (b) forecasts for the first two post-shock years. 
The current method for calculating the trend and the shortfall was implemented in 1979 
after observing that export earnings increase geometrically (i.e., by a constant rate) and not 
arithmetically (i.e., by a constant amount) (Lim, 1991, page 59). It is also considered 
appropriate because use of the medium-trend value of export earnings permits 
consideration of the fact that a “deceleration of export growth could lead to a fall of output 
below its long-term growth trend, and a below-trend output is precisely what one should try 
to avoid when an economy is hit by a shock” (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2008, page 10). exports and the imports of the claiming country.
8 
Another important CFF operating rule concerns the fact that transfers are loans 
and must be repaid within five years; repurchases are to be made in equal quarterly 
instalments between the third and the fifth years. Finally, being non-concessional 
loans, interest has to be paid by all countries, based on the base rate charged under the 
General Resources Account of the Fund.  
 
The CFF and other IMF lending facilities: who can apply for CFF support? 
All IMF members are eligible for CFF support, provided that the export side shock 
meets the above-described qualifying criteria. Besides the CFF, the Fund has 
implemented alternative instruments to help its members affected by exogenous 
shocks. 
For instance, non-concessional loans are provided, mainly through Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBA), and occasionally through the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) or 
the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF).
9 Since 1952, IMF members have been able 
to borrow from SBAs, which provide members with assistance so that they can draw 
on up to a specified amount, usually over 12-18 months, to deal with a short-term BoP 
problem. The term “stand-by” means that, subject to conditionality, a member has a 
right to draw the money made available if needed. 
In 1999 the IMF introduced the PRGF which is a concessional lending 
window intended to give a more central role to pro-poor growth considerations in the 
design of IMF-supported programmes in LICs. Eligibility for PRGF support is based 
on IMF assessment of a country's pro capita income, drawing on the cut-off point for 
eligibility to World Bank concessional lending (currently 2007 pro capita GNI of less 
than US$1095).
10 
                                             
8 The quota limit has been revised many times since 1963. In the beginning it was 25 percent 
of quota, in 1996 it was raised to 50 percent and it reached 100 percent of a member’s IMF 
quota in 1979 (Lim, 1991, page 60). 
9 In 1974 the IMF introduced the EFF, which is intended to help IMF members tackle 
structural economic problems that are causing serious weaknesses in its balance of 
payments. Since 1997, the SRF has provided additional short-term financing for members 
experiencing exceptional balance of payments difficulties because of a sudden, disruptive 
loss of market confidence reflected in capital outflows (www.imf.org).  
10 As of August 2008, the PRGF-eligible countries are: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde(a), Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Samoa(a), Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Dominica(a), 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada(a), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya, Kiribati1, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, P.D.R., Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives1, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda,  Sao 
Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone,  Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia 
(a), St. Vincent and the Grenadines(a), Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, 
Tonga(a), Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu(a), Vietnam, Yemen, Republic of, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe(b).  Unlike under the CFF, loans under the PRGF carry an annual concessional 
interest rate of 0.5 percent, with repayments made semi-annually, beginning 5½ years 
and ending 10 years after the disbursement. Another important difference with respect 
to the CFF is that PRGF-eligible countries may normally borrow up to a maximum of 
140 percent of their IMF quota under a three-year arrangement (the upper threshold of 
the disbursement may be increased to 185 percent of quota in exceptional 
circumstances). The amount will depend on the country's BoP needs, the strength of 
its adjustment programme, and its previous and outstanding use of IMF credit. 
Finally, "low-access" PRGF programmes with a standard level of 10 percent of quota 
may be used for members with little or no immediate BoP problems.
11 
The above short description of IMF facilities allows the depiction of what the 
financial channels are through which a member may apply for assistance when it has a 
BOP problem. It is quite clear that PRGF-eligible countries with a PRGF programme 
in place access funds through their arrangements with the IMF rather through the less 
concessional CFF (see also dePlaa and Tabova, 2005, on this point). Furthermore, 
there is the case of IMF members which are eligible for PRGF but do not have a 
PRGF in place. These countries are entitled to the ESF instrument which offers 
similar conditions to the PRFG and, thus, is more concessional than the CFF.    
In practice, there is an overlapping of lending facilities (PRGF/ESF, CFF, SBA) for 
LICs experiencing a BoP problem. It is inconvenient for these members to access CFF 
or SBA because they can borrow from PRGF at concessional interest rates, while only 
those countries not eligible for PRGF (those with a 2007 GNI pro capita of more than 
$1,095) turn to the CFF or to SBAs. 
 
                                                                                                                               
(a) In 2007 an exception to the GNI pro capita operational cut off for IDA eligibility (a 2007 
GNI pro capita of less than US$1,095) was made for some small island economies; these 
countries continue to be eligible for PRGF and IDA assistance, notwithstanding their pro 
capita income levels.  
(b) Since 24-09-2001, Zimbabwe has been ineligible due to overdue financial obligations to 
the PRGF Trust. 
11 Other significant differences between the CFF and the PRGF lie in the latter’s three 
distinctive features. We firstly refer to the principle of broad public participation and 
greater country ownership which are central to the PRGF. With regards this, discussions on 
the policies underlying PRGF-supported programs are more open, since they are based on 
the nationally owned Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. With increased national 
ownership, PRGF conditionality is expected to be more parsimonious, focused on the 
Fund's core areas of expertise, and limited to measures that have a direct, critical impact on 
the program's macroeconomic objectives. Secondly, PRGF programmes are intended to be 
more closely linked to each country's poverty reduction and growth priorities. Key policy 
measures aimed at poverty reduction and growth are identified and given priority during 
the PRSP process, and, if feasible, their budgetary costs are assessed. Thirdly, PRGF 
programmes focus on strengthening governance, in order to assist countries' efforts to plan 
targeted, well-prioritised spending. Measures to improve public resource management, 
transparency, and accountability are of particular importance. While an exhaustive 
evaluation of PRGF-supported programmes is not available (the effects of IMF support on 
poverty reduction and growth may be evaluated only in the medium-long run), assessments 
of how PRFG-programmes have worked since 1999, in terms of the guiding principals 
(conditionality, ownership and governance) can be found in IMF (2004a, 2005 and 2007). The use of IMF’s CFF 
The most recent source of complete information about the CFF is the last review of 
2004 (IMF, 2004a). The reported data indicate that the facility was used 344 times 
over the period 1963-1999. Its use was recurrent in the 1970s and in the early 1980s 
when the CFF absorbed a large proportion of the total credit that the IMF extended to 
developing countries (the peak was reached over the period 1976-1980 when use of 
the CFF accounted for 45% of total IMF lending (Goreux 1980)). While Griffith and 
others (2008, table 2) report data indicating that the average incidence of CFF 
transfers was 10.69% of total IMF credit from 1990 to 2006, it is worth noticing that 
the facility has not been used since 2000, even though many IMF members 
experienced substantial drops in exports in the tourism sector due to the attacks of 
11th September, 2001 and, in 2002, southern African countries suffered a supply 
shock in cereal sectors because of drought (IMF 2004a, p. 6). In such circumstances, 
the countries affected by these exogenous shocks prefer not to use the IMF’s CFF 
because of high conditionality and of the possibility of using other financial support 
which is more attractive than the non-concessional CFF (IMF, 2004a, page 6; Griffith 
and Ocampo, 2008, page 11). The availability of alternative sources of financing, 
which are thought to be superior to CFF, is the main reason given by IMF staff to 
explain the limited use of CFF [these views are widely discussed in IMF (2004a, 
2004b)]. 
The following data provide useful details about which kind of facility is used 
by IMF members. As of 19th March, 2009, 23 PRGF eligible countries have a PRGF 
arrangement in place. The total amount agreed to all these PRGF-programmes is 
1,200 MLN SDRs. Among the current PRGF supported countries, 19 belong to the 
ACP group. Again, 3 PRGF-eligible countries without an active PRGF (Kyrgys 
Republic, Malawi and Senegal) have an ESF-type arrangement (the total amount of 
loans agreed is 167 MLN SDRs). At the same date, no country has a CFF-type loan, 
while 14 countries have an active stand-by-arrangement (SBA) with the IMF and 
borrowers receive a very large amount of finance (33,369 MLN SDRs) through this 
lending instrument.
12 Looking at the recent past, it emerges that SBAs have been the 
facility which IMF members have used the most over the last decade too. For 
instance, as of 29th December, 2000, 16 countries had an SBA in place (the amount 
agreed was 28,007 MLN SDRs), while there were 9 active extended arrangements 
(9,113 MLN SDR) and there were 34 PRGF in place (3,135 MLN SDRs).
13 
The above distribution of IMF lending by facility reflects, other thing being 
equal, the incentive to borrow from one instrument rather than from others. What 
clearly emerges is that the PRGF has introduced an asymmetry between LICs and 
middle-income-countries, in the sense that nowadays the former mainly turn to PRFG, 
or to its augmented access to accommodate temporary shocks, as it is more 
concessional than others. Today PRGF-eligible countries without a PRGF, essentially 
LICs which are starting to feel the effect of the current financial crisis, are beginning 
to use the ESF.
14 On the other hand, middle-income-countries mainly use SBAs, 
                                             
12  Data available at  http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/activity/2009/021909.htm 
13  Data available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/activity/2000/122900.htm 
14 The ESF is a short-term concessional window to help LICs cope with external economic 
events. It was introduced in 2005 and revised in September 2008 (IMF 2006; 2008a). The 
reduced conditionality burden established in the 2008 revision seems to be enough to whose assistance allows borrowers to deal with shocks for which the CFF is 
envisaged (as said above access SBAs has been massive over the period 2000-2009). 
In brief, data suggest that the Fund’s primary form of support is now through 
augmentations of the PRGF facility, and SBAs for countries without a PRGF in place. 
 
Non-use of the CFF and the IMF decision to maintain the facility 
The fact that the CFF has not been used in the last decade has stimulated a debate 
aimed at understanding whether it is still a useful service for IMF members. This sub-
paragraph presents and discusses the arguments made by the IMF at the time of the 
last review and used to explain the retaining of the facility. An initial useful point of 
reference to be borne in mind is that the 2004 decision to keep the facility was taken 
even after evaluating three types of recommendations for CFF revision made by the 
WTO (2002), UNCTAD (2003 and 2007) and FAO(2002). 
The first recommendation made by these organisations regards the payments 
which, according to the WTO and UNCTAD, have to be concessional in order to help 
those LICs dealing with shocks better. It is worth noticing that IMF members often 
suffer from other BoP problems and, therefore, CCF funds have to be transferred in 
conjunction with an upper credit tranche-type arrangement. In such a case, the PRGF 
offers more flexile answers than the conditional CFF (IMF 2004a). Indeed, the 
possibility of borrowing at concessional terms is guaranteed, for instance, by an 
augmentation under a PRGF which is more appropriate than a CFF because it covers a 
wider range of shocks and is concessional (IMF 2004a, 2005). Therefore, the IMF 
response to the WTO, UNCTAD and FAO seems to be that CFF conditional loans do 
not necessarily mean that LICs cannot borrow at more concessional terms. Indeed, as 
discussed above, LICs  apply for PRGF support. Implicitly, these IMF arguments 
seem to indicate that the CFF remains a facility for all IMF members, except LICs. 
The second recommendation was that the import coverage of CFF should 
include all basic foodstuffs and not only cereals. According to IMF staff, one reason 
not to include other staples in the CFF is the availability of data needed for CFF 
calculation. Moreover, the IMF recognises that the “CFF is not the appropriate 
instrument to deal with the balance of payment costs of adjustment to permanent 
changes in relative prices and market access associated with trade liberalization” 
(IMF, 2004a, page 17), which, on the contrary, represent some of the aims of the 
Trade Integration Mechanism  activated by the IMF itself.
15 
The third and final recommendation is that payouts should by automatically 
linked to specific occurrences (in the sense that the facility should operate on the basis 
                                                                                                                               
convince poor countries to sign up to ESF for the first time. In late 2008 Malawi agreed a 
$77 million ESF loan, Senegal agreed a $75 million loan, and the Kyrgyz Republic one of 
$100 million. At the same time, the Comoros islands arranged a loan for $3 million, In 
January 2009 Ethiopia borrowed $50 million. Loans to Ethiopia and Comoros were for low 
amounts and will be disbursed under the so-called “rapid-access component” of the ESF, 
meaning little conditionality (data are drawn from www.info.org).  
15 The Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) was introduced in April 2004 to assist member 
countries in meeting BoP shortfalls which might result from multilateral trade 
liberalization. The TIM is not a special lending facility, but rather a policy designed to 
make resources more predictably available under existing IMF facilities (www.imf.org). of real time instead of ex-post mechanisms) and conditions for stand-alone CFF 
purchases should disappear. The IMF’s reply to these recommendations is that, in the 
spirit of the 2000 CFF revision, the speed of response to shocks is ensured by stand-
alone CFF purchases which are conditional on the fact that, apart from the effect of 
the temporary shock, a country’s balance of payment position is satisfactory. 
According to IMF staff, relaxing this condition would make compensation more 
automatic and would probably increase the demand for the CFF, but the IMF intends 
to maintain the requirement because it limits adverse selection problems in the sense 
that resources from an unconditional facility might be directed towards developing 
countries that are not willing to adopt adjustment policies. In other words, the 
strengthened requirements introduced at the time of the CFF revision are consistent 
with the Fund’s mandate to support orderly BOP adjustments with appropriate 
safeguards to Fund resources and, therefore, should be retained.
16  
After having taken into consideration the above recommendations and even 
after realising that the premises (temporariness of shocks and absence of alternative 
facilities) on which the CFF is based are only partially satisfied (IMF 2003,  2004a)
17  
and, therefore, that there are substantial clear arguments for its removal, the IMF staff 
“does not see this as an urgent matter” and concludes that “there is “some value in 
maintaining the facility in its current form while other financing instruments to help 
low-income member countries cope with shocks are being developed” (IMF 2004a, 
page 18). Again, “just as abolishing the CFF would seem to come with little cost to 
the Fund or its members, the same applies to keeping the CFF” (IMF 2004a, page 18). 
But, what are the reasons behind the Fund’s position? One declared argument 
refers to the fact that the CFF might be used to assist members in a transparent way 
and with resources that are to be considered additional to those under other IMF 
facilities (IMF 2004a). Furthermore, the IMF insists on saying that, if a member’s 
BoP position is satisfactory, except for the impact of the shock, the CFF may offer 
fast assistance with weak conditionality. At the same time, by referring to middle-
income countries, it said that international liquidity constraints have been relaxed and 
these countries may resort to private financing capital or, when that is not enough, to 
credit tranches under SBAs, which the IMF itself considers “very suitable to be used 
in the face of temporary BoP shocks” (IMF, 2004a, 18).  
It seems that the 2004 decision to keep the CFF was made without providing 
convincing reasons. The maintaining of the CFF would seem to be part of a wait-and-
                                             
16 With respect to CFF conditionality, Hewitt (2007) argues that it is the main motivation for 
the limited use of the IMF CFF. If, for the first 20 years of application, the condition to 
cooperate with the Fund was a “loose gentlemen’s agreement” (Hewitt, 2007, page 3), 
since the early 1980s the CFF has been included in all IMF systems of conditionality. 
Similar comments against conditionality have been expressed by many others experts (see 
above all, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2008), Martin and Bargawi (2005) and Tabova 
(2005). 
17 The appropriate policy dealing with temporary shocks is financing rather than adjustment. 
However, commodity prices exhibit a declining long-term trend and very 
frequent/persistent short-term deviations from this trend. On one hand, this means that a 
mix of financing and adjustment is the appropriate response to shocks while, on the other, it 
implies that the “CFF may not be a suitable instrument to deal with a large part of the 
shocks for which the CFF is mostly used” (IMF, 2004a, page 10).  see attitude adopted by the IMF in order to decide about the usefulness of the facility 
when the review of the entire structure of IMF lending instruments is concluded. 
To end this discussion, it is extremely important to point out that, as is 
documented above, since the last CFF review, IMF members have continued not to 
use the facility and, therefore, it is time that IMF staff re-examined the proposal to 
abolish, as announced by the IMF itself in 2004 (IMF, 2004, page 19; IMF 2004b), or 
radically revise the facility. Under the current arrangements, the CFF serves no useful 
purpose and is not an attractive option for LICs given its non-concessional nature.   
Behind the non-use of the CFF from 2000 onwards 
This sub-paragraph summarises the two key elements explaining the lack of use of the 
CFF. The first main caveat of the facility is that the CFF interest rate, currently 3.05 
per cent per annum, is certainly more favourable than that available from commercial 
banks for most LDCs. However, the CFF interest rate is higher than that of the IMF's 
PRGF, under which the IMF expects most LDCs to borrow. Secondly, and as 
mentioned in several parts of this paper, a shortcoming of the CFF is that it requires 
conditionality: CFF funding is non-concessional and over time the CFF has been 
modified to increase conditionality (requiring accompanying reforms through a 
specific IMF arrangement). IMF loans are usually provided under an arrangement 
which sets out the policies that a country intends to pursue and which forms the basis 
of access to the loan. Arrangements are based on economic programmes formulated 
by countries in consultation with the IMF. Loans are then disbursed in instalments as 
the programme is implemented. As a result of the CFF 2000 revision, conditionality 
has been increased. Access to the CFF will now be generally available only in the 
context of an arrangement.  
This also holds true because the stand alone CFF purchases, i.e. the low 
conditional assistance under the CFF, may be used by countries with a viable Balance 
of Payments position (except for the effects of the export side shocks). The crucial 
point is that these CFF-eligible countries would normally have access to alternative 
sources of finance (SBA, emergency assistance and, if they are LICs, PRFG\ESF). 
Furthermore, countries experiencing structurally weak Balance of Payments usually 
have other forms of Fund financing such as the PRGF or emergency assistance (IMF 
2004c, 2007). 
Although a detailed assessment of IMF conditionality goes beyond the aims of 
this paper, it appears useful to remember that, at the time of writing, the IMF is 
concluding a review of all lending instruments and conditionality. 
This IMF review will only cover conditionality attached to IMF loans used by 
middle-income countries. Compared to the last conditionality review, conducted 
between 2001 and 2003, this review is secretive, with no public consultation period, 
no open meetings and no discussion with external stakeholders. IMF staff are also 
preparing two papers on the IMF’s lending instruments - one on middle-income 
countries and one on LICs. Despite a controversial report on structural conditionality 
released by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office in 2007 (IMF 2007), the 
financial crisis programmes show that traditional conditionality requiring strict fiscal 
adjustments and conditionality is still being used. The number of conditions remains 
stable at about 17 per programme–year and this evidence contrasts with the IMF’s 
initiative to streamline conditionality. Furthermore, the IOE review reports that IMF 
conditions continue to be criticised on a country-ownership basis. The demand is for the setting up of a restricted number of prior actions and 
performance criteria focussing on reforms at high impact in LICs and limited to the 
core areas of IMF activities (fiscal and monetary policy, finance and certain aspects of 
trade) (IMF, 2007, page 19). Indeed, it is argued that only these activities help 
developing countries to achieve a certain degree of macroeconomic stability of their 
economy and therefore support their growth and their poverty reduction programmes 
(IMF 2008b). 
The impact of the IMF CFF on Export Instability 
After presenting the CFF operating rules and discussing the recent non-use of the 
facility by developing countries faced by exogenous shocks, it is useful to summarise 
the results obtained by economists when analysing the impact of the IMF’s CFF. 
Many scholars have assessed the effect of the CFF in terms of its capacity to stabilise 
export earnings. In this respect, the first study was that of Finger and Derosa (1980) 
which considers the 71 developing countries benefiting from CFF compensations over 
the period 1963-1977. The stabilising impact is measured by comparing an index of 
instability calculated for export earnings with and without CFF payments. This 
approach was repeated by Herrmann (1983), who considers 20 developing countries 
that received CFF assistance over the period 1967-1980, Lim (1991), who updates the 
analysis to 1987 and considers 60 participating countries, and Herrmann and others 
(1993), who take into consideration 92 countries receiving CFF payments up to 1987. 
The results of these studies clearly show that the IMF’s CFF failed to reduce the 
export instability of the developing countries that received compensation for drops in 
exports. This holds true regardless of the period of analysis, the method used to 
measure the short-term instability and the sample of countries covered by the 
studies.
18 
To sum up, the empirical evidence finds that the CFF exerts a limited stabilising 
impact which the authors all ascribe to the formula used for determining the export 
shortfall, to the administrative time-lag between the application year and the period in 
which the payment is made, and to the only partial coverage of the shortfall in exports 
due to the fact that the member’s IMF quota limits the amount which can be 
withdrawn. 
3. COMMODITY-RELATED SCHEME: THE STABEX 
The arguments against export earning instability [see, besides many others, the 
pioneering works by MacBean (1966) and Maizels (1992)] supported past choices 
made by the EU, when it decided to adopt the STABEX, i.e. the scheme for stabilising 
the export earnings of countries belonging to the Lomé Convention. STABEX 
operated from 1975 to 2000 and its aim was to assist ACP commodity exporting 
countries when they experienced a fall in export earnings in selected agricultural 
sectors. The basic idea behind STABEX was to settle payments in favour of ACPs in 
                                             
18 Beside the stabilising impact on export earnings instability, some authors have evaluated 
the role of CFF from a more general perspective. For instance, Herrmann et al. (1993) show 
that, from the national point of view of the recipient country, the CFF has to be evaluated 
positively. This is due “to the dominant impact of the transfers benefits the countries realised” 
and implies that “the major incentive to participate in the CFF is the implicit income transfer 
that the drawing country receives” (Herrmann et al., 1993, page 83). order to compensate for export shortfalls and, therefore, to re-establish the level of 
earnings which they would have received under normal market conditions. The main 
provision of STABEX indicates that it was only aimed at reducing the instability and 
risks faced by commodity-export-dependent ACP states when the shortfall of earnings 
was substantial and that it generally regarded exports of eligible products to the EU 
market. Compensation claims by considering commodity exports to all destinations 
are also possible [Article 197(5) of Lomé Agreement].
19 
When it was implemented, STABEX was considered to be highly innovative 
because its micro-based rules, in the sense that it was to be aimed at selected products, 
were relevant to the export structure of each ACP. The implicit rationale of STABEX 
was based on the following virtuous circle: when the EU-ACPs channelled funds 
towards commodities whose exports were unstable but important for the country 
concerned and these financial resources were used in the sector which suffered the 
shortfall in revenue, then STABEX contributed to reducing the total EEI and, ceteris 
paribus, to raising national long run growth.
  
 
The failure of STABEX 
In what follows, we briefly comment on certain STABEX mechanisms which have 
conditioned its effectiveness. This is done to see whether any policy implications 
might be derived from a study of the workings of the main stabilising scheme 
implemented by the EU: future EU-ACP relationships might profit from what can be 
learnt from the past.
20 
The aspects which are considered here are specific to STABEX and regard the 
composition of the basket of goods which benefit from transfers and the use of these 
transfers in the specific sector for which they had been claimed.
21 One would expect 
that, ceteris paribus, the greater the number of products covered by STABEX is, the 
greater the observable effect will be at the level of total exports and, therefore, the 
greater the impact will be on ACP growth (Aiello 1999b, 2002; Lim 1991). On the 
other hand, the logic underlying the STABEX aim to stabilise earnings from exports 
of each product requires that compensations are transferred to the sector concerned in 
order to allow producers both to reorganise production and to improve their 
investment planning. This also remains one of the key recommendations on 
                                             
19 STABEX transfers were paid to stabilise the exports of 49 selected commodities, where, as 
general rule, compensation could be claimed for exports from each ACP to EU (Article 
197(5) of Lomé Agreement)  The scheme was activated if: (a) the exports of an eligible 
product represented at least 5.5% of total exports from an ACP (dependence threshold). 
The full dependence threshold was applied only for 12 ACPs, because the reduced 1% 
threshold was applied to least-developed and/or landlocked and/or islands; (b) the exports 
to the EU market (or to all destinations, in specific cases) of any STABEX product were at 
least 6% below the reference level (fluctuation threshold); (c) instability did not depend on 
the operating of commercial policies which discriminated against the EU. 
20 For a discussion on STABEX, see, above many others, Aiello (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2002), 
Herrmann et al. (1993), Hewitt (2007) and Lim (1991). 
21 STABEX also exerted a limited stabilising impact because of the substantial delays in 
payments made by the EU. These delays make STABEX less effective and, sometimes, 
pro-cyclical rather than countercyclical (Brun et al., 2001). The stabilising impact of 
STABEX is detailed in Aiello (1999a). See also Lim (1991).  commodity issues by the panel of eminent persons organised by UNCTAD in 2003. 
They suggested the inclusion of a “pass-through mechanism to actual producers and 
consumers” within a facility aimed at “insulating developing countries from the worst 
effects of international price volatility” (UNCTAD, 2003).  STABEX product-
coverage One of the most controversial and highly debated aspects of STABEX was 
its product coverage. The aim of the EU-ACP agreement was to provide financial 
support to the exports of traditional commodities, in particular tropical tree crops, 
upon which many ACPs, as exporters, and EU countries, as importers, were 
dependent. It would appear, however, that the basket of products covered by 
STABEX (29 in Lomé I and 49 in Lomé IV) might have put ACP countries at a 
disadvantage. In fact, ACPs had incentives to achieve certain levels of production and 
exports in the selected sectors in order to satisfy the qualifying criteria of STABEX 
and then claim compensation. Yet it was unclear what the economic justification was 
for excluding various products (sugar, meat and tobacco) from the stabilisation 
scheme which were (and are) crucial for many ACPs (Botswana, Fiji, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Zimbabwe).
22 One consequence of the fact 
that the basket of goods covered by the system was tilted in favour of certain tropical 
agricultural products was the way STABEX payments were distributed on a country 
and/or product level. As STABEX worked it was of doubtful utility because of the 
compensations made in favour of the biggest and the richest ACPs. These doubts 
increase when one considers that from Lomé IV the STABEX payments were grants.  
Use of Funds. Another characteristic of STABEX that requires a very brief 
discussion is the utilisation of transfers by the beneficiary countries. The flexibility in 
allocating compensation has been accompanied by certain discretion in the fund 
management by the ACPs. It is reasonable to consider that, from the point of view of 
the individual country, the lack of constraints in the regulations on how to use the 
transfers did not represent a problem, since, given currency shortages, BoP and debt 
problems, a government’s aim was to increase the acquisition of foreign currency, 
whatever the source. Operating in this way, however, the EU can be considered 
equally responsible for a process which generated an inaccurate perception of 
variability in export earnings: ACPs linked the wide variations in revenues from 
exports with the resultant transfers from the EU. In other words, the ACPs saw 
STABEX as an additional aid window, not as a stabilisation device. It is quite clear 
that this worked as a disincentive to the imposition of policies aimed at removing the 
domestic causes of instability.  
 
4. FLEX: THE NEW FACILITY PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ACPS  
Bearing in mind the lessons learnt in the past, in 2000, the EU set up a new 
programme, the FLEX, which was intended to be wider and more simple than 
                                             
22 This choice can certainly not be justified on the grounds that certain products (meat and 
sugar) were included in preferential commercial agreements because the preferential 
policies were not concerned with export instability and, even if this had not been the case, it 
would be difficult to understand the inclusion of bananas to which Lomé granted a specific 
protocol. The paradox surrounding the exclusion of these products can be highlighted by 
recalling the guiding principle for the formation of the STABEX basket of goods, which 
was «to take account of employment, of the deterioration of the terms of trade between the 
EU and ACPs, on the level of development in the latter as well as the difficulties of 
isolation faced by less developed ACP states» (Art. 17, Lomé I). STABEX. FLEX was introduced within the framework of EU-ACP cooperation and 
its motivation is clearly explained in the following:  
 
“The parties recognise that instability of export earnings, 
particularly in the agricultural and mining sectors, may adversely 
affect the development of ACP States and jeopardise the 
attainment of their development requirements. A system of 
additional support in order to mitigate the adverse effects of any 
instability in export earnings, including in the agricultural and 
mining sector, is therefore set up within the financial envelope for 
support to long-term development” (Article 68(1) of the 2005 
revised Cotonou agreement). 
 
This article confirms the EU-ACP orientation towards provision of financial 
assistance to developing countries whose development process is hindered by the 
variability of their export earnings. To be more precise, the declared scope that EU 
and ACPs want to pursue through FLEX is defined as follows: 
 
“The purpose of support in cases of short term fluctuations in 
export earnings is to safeguard socio-economic reforms and 
policies that could be affected negatively as a result of a drop in 
revenue and to remedy the adverse effects of instability of export 
earnings, in particular from agricultural and mining products” 
(Article 68(2) of the 2005 revised Cotonou agreement). 
 
In brief, FLEX is a facility which mobilises additional resources from a country ‘B’ 
(nonprogrammable) envelope if certain qualifying conditions are met. As will be 
discussed later, these eligibility criteria regard the magnitude of the shock, in the 
sense that the loss of export earnings must be above a given threshold, and, up to 
2008, the effect of the shock on the public deficit of the ACP concerned. If the 
country is eligible, then funds will be provided in swift-disbursing form, as budget 
support, so as to guarantee counter-cyclical fiscal relief. 
  Because of reasons that will be explained in the following discussion, these 
eligibility criteria were revised in 2004 and 2008. In what follows, we briefly describe 
some of the facility’s basic operational rules, as they were established in the initial 
FLEX and the 2004 revision, whereas the 2008 revision will be thoroughly 
documented, given that it regards how FLEX currently works.  
 
Eligibility Criteria for FLEX support in 2000 
From 2000 until the 2004 revision, FLEX payments were activated if, in the 
application year N, export earnings from goods were 10% (2% for LDCs) below the 
reference level. Alternatively, ACPs could claim assistance if a sudden drop of 10% 
(2% for LDCs) in earnings related to the total for agricultural or mineral products and 
these sectors were considered to be highly relevant for that particular ACP economy 
(the exports from these sectors had to represent at least 40% of national exports) 
(Annex II, art. 9(1/a) of the Cotonou Agreement). Whatever the export aggregation 
(total exports or agricultural/mineral exports), the reference level was determined as 
the arithmetical average of earnings in the years N-4 to N-2.  Furthermore, it was 
required that the drop in export earnings caused a worsening of 10% in the programmed public deficit either for the year of application or for the successive one 
(Annex II, art. 9(1/b) of the Cotonou Agreement).  
ACPs that met the qualifying criteria had access to FLEX support for a 
maximum four successive years (Annex II, art. 9(2) of the Cotonou Agreement). As 
for the use of financial support, the ACP-EU agreement established that the additional 
funds should be reflected in the ACP country’s public account. The general rule was 
that the use of resources ought to be made in accordance with the programming rules 
and methods, as jointly established by the EU and the beneficiary ACP, and had to 
address finance activities included in the national budget (Article 9,2 of the Annex IV 
of the Cotonou Agreement). However, beneficiaries could devote FLEX funds to 
other uses, although the agreement was vague in specifying what the alternative uses 
of the financial support were (“a part of additional resources may be set aside for 
specific sectors”, Annex II, art. 9(3) of the Cotonou Agreement). 
 
The 2004 and 2008 FLEX Revisions 
Evidence from the past shows that the initial eligibility criteria were too stringent, 
resulting in relatively few ACP countries’ being considered eligible. This is why 
FLEX has already been revised twice, in 2004 and 2008. Both revisions aimed at 
improving the functioning of FLEX, in the sense of simplifying the eligibility criteria, 
so the facility effectively pursued its objectives. It is worth noticing that the revisions 
did not regard the main principle of the instrument, i.e. financial assistance to cover 
for losses in Government revenues as a consequence of a shortfall in export earnings 
(Commission of the European Communities 2004b). 
  From the experience of applying FLEX in its initial years of implementation 
(2000-2002), it emerged that few countries applying for FLEX support met the 
eligibility criteria.
23 Modification of the facility was, therefore, proposed
 (Commission 
of the European Communities 2004a; 2004b). By taking into account the proposal 
made by the EU Commission, the EU-ACP revised the terms and conditions of 
financing for fluctuations in export earnings in 2004 (ACP-EC Council of Ministers, 
2004). 
The main change made in 2004 regarded the reduction from 10% to 2% of the 
increase that ACPs had to register in their public deficit as a result of export side 
exogenous shocks. Furthermore, the special clause applying to LDCs was extended to 
landlocked countries and island states, lowering the eligibility threshold to a 2 per 
cent loss in export earnings.
24 
Had the proposed criteria been applied from 2000–02, ACP states would have 
received €255 million from FLEX, six times more than the amount actually disbursed 
(DFID 2004; Commission of the European Communities 2004a). 
                                             
23 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/development/pr120204_en.htm or § 1.4.2 of this 
paper.  
24 In 2005, the new paragraph 3 of Article 68 of the revised Cotonou Agreement extended to 
“post conflict and post natural disaster ACP States” the more favourable treatment in the 
allocation of resources, as already established for least developed, landlocked and island 
countries because of their extreme dependence on exports (ACP-EC Council of Ministers, 
2005). This extension also regards eligibility for FLEX support, as regulated in the 2008 
FLEX revision (ACP-EC Council of Ministers, 2008; Commission of the European 
Communities 2007).   FLEX was amended again with Decision No 1/2008 of the ACP-EC Council 
of Ministers of 13 June 2008 (ACP-EC Council of Ministers, 2008). While this 
revision started with the suggestion made by the ACP group in January 2005 to 
amend FLEX, the EU Commission and the ACP countries agreed
25 that the proposal 
would be examined later because the “amendment was not dealt with in the 
framework of the five-year revision of the Cotonou Agreement” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007, page 2). 
Below, we document and discuss the main features of the last revision. The 
first aspect to be pointed out concerns the fact that the eligibility condition triggered 
to the magnitude of the shock remains the same with respect to the rule established in 
the 2004 revision.
26 For ease of exposition and in order to save space, we summarise 
the main changes in the 2008 FLEX in the following points: 
  
•  the decision to eliminate the eligibility criterion concerning a worsening in 
programmed public deficit; 
•  the exclusion of the most extreme year from calculation of the reference value 
needed to measure shock size; 
•  the rule that limits access to FLEX support to three successive years rather 
than four years, as it was in the past.  
•  the method of calculating and mobilising FLEX support 
 
There are several reasons for abolishing the eligibility criterion relating to the impact 
on public deficit. For instance, the EU Commission argues that there are some 
difficulties in establishing the impact of shortfalls in export earning on government 
budgets, because the country-by-country variations of tax systems may influence the 
period (N+1, N+2) when the impact of a shock to the public budget occurs. 
Furthermore, the impact may be influenced by macroeconomic management and the 
grip on public finances. Therefore, if countries’ circumstances cause differences in the 
effective impact of a shock, than the second eligibility criterion might favour ACPs 
with less rigorous management of public finances. Finally, the arbitrary 2 per cent 
worsening of the deficit eligibility threshold might alter results, in the sense that 
countries with small programmed deficit may enjoy easier access, ceteris paribus, 
FLEX support than countries with substantial programmed deficit (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007). 
As for calculating the reference value, the method used since 2000 has been 
the arithmetic mean of the exports over the years T-4 to T-2. With the 2008 revision, 
                                             
25 Declaration II of the Final Act of the Agreement signed in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 - 
Joint declaration on Article 68 of the Cotonou Agreement: "The ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers will examine, in application of the provisions contained in Article 100 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, the proposals of the ACP side concerning Annex II thereof on short-
term fluctuations in export earnings." 
26 A country may apply for compensation if it registers a 10% loss in export earnings (2% in the 
case of LDCs, landlocked, island, post-conflict and post-natural disaster States) with respect 
to the export reference value. The loss of 10% (2%) may be determined by taking into 
account the total agricultural/mineral exports given the condition that exports on the part of 
these sectors represent more than 40% of total national exports, or they are between 20% and 
40%, provided that total earnings do not increase more than proportionally with respect to the 
impact of the loss of export earnings. the reference level is calculated considering the years T-4 to T-1, excluding the most 
extreme year. This final amendment differs from the initial ACP proposal to consider 
a six-year reference period, excluding the highest and lowest values. As argued by the 
EU Commission (Commission of the European Communities, 2007) a six-year 
reference period may reflect a structural trend against the focus of FLEX on short-
term instability. 
While the removal of the public deficit condition makes access to FLEX less 
restrictive than before, a minimum impact threshold has, at the same time, been 
established: the 2008 revised FLEX states that the drop in export earnings “must be 
0.5% of GDP or more for there to be entitlement to additional support.
27 Entitlement 
to additional support shall be limited to three successive years” (Revised Article 9(2) 
of Annex I to the Cotonou Agreement). It is important to notice that the introduction 
of the minimum impact threshold is made with the intention of avoiding the risk of a 
proliferation of small compensations not helping the beneficiary countries in their 
macroeconomic stability and development processes, while the reduction in the 
successive years of eligibility is more in line with the purpose of FLEX, in so much as 
it is a facility dealing with short-term instability resulting from international business 
cycles and not with structural declining trends of export earnings.    
Moreover, the new FLEX addresses the issue of how the amount of additional 
financial support is to be determined. In the revised FLEX, the amount of aid support, 
i.e. the theoretical effect of the export shortfall on the public budget, is calculated as 
the product of the loss of export earnings in the application year and the “government 
revenue/gross domestic product” ratio averaged over the four years preceding the 
application year, excluding the most extreme value and capping this ratio at 25%. 
While the method of calculating the effects of the shock reflects the difficulties above 
discussed in using the budget deficit as a reference point, the cap of 25% is expected 
to help ACPs which are less well-armed against export side shock and, in particular, 
the “countries with relatively weak central government revenue excluding grants” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007, page 6). 
Another important novelty in the 2008 revision regards the method of 
allocating financial support. Up to 2008, ACPs eligible for budgetary support received 
FLEX assistance as a general budgetary support, while, for ACPs not eligible for 
budgetary support, FLEX financial assistance is added to the Country Indicative 
Programme (NIP) in order to finance new initiatives or to top up existing projects and 
programmes. For this later group of countries, FLEX assistance “does not contribute 
directly to macroeconomic stabilization and is not truly counter-cyclical in nature” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007, page 7). Up to 80% of potential 
financial assistance could be disbursed in advance. In the 2008 revision, it was 
decided to increase the level of these advances up to 100% and to introduce a 
specifying rule according to which advances are reserved for countries “where FLEX 
financial support can be implemented by means of general budgetary support”. 
Therefore, the increase in the advances to 100% should guarantee a reduction in the 
disbursement period,
28 whereas, the possibility of claiming payment in advance is 
                                             
27 This percentage is smaller than that (0.7%) included in the proposal for a Council decision 
developed by the EU Commission in 2007 (Commission of the European Communities, 
2007). 
28 The timing of FLEX support is expected to be as follows: final date for FLEX requests in the 
first half of year N+1 and the EDF Committee decision and the consequent disbursement to restricted to those countries which aim to use the additional support as budgetary 
support, something which is strictly in line with FLEX objectives. The allocation of 
FLEX support to ACPs not eligible for budgetary support is allowed only after the 
shortfall in export earnings is documented with final statistics. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the 2008 revision stresses the orientation 
according to which FLEX transfers should be used to “develop market based 
insurance schemes offering protection against the risk of fluctuations in export 
earnings” (Article 9(3) of the Annex to the Cotonou Agreement). The focus on market 
based insurance and on other alternative uses of funds has been allowed since 2000 
(“a part of additional resources may also be set aside for specific sectors”), but the 
2008 revision specifies this point. 
The elaborations of data from the EU Commission allow for an evaluation of how 
FLEX worked over the period 2000-2007. The discussion made in the next section 
will permit the understanding of: 
•  the frequency of export side shocks; 
•  whether, and to what extent, the criteria for being eligible for FLEX support 
have been stringent; 
•  the availability of finance with respect to the demand for support from ACPs; 
•  the promptness of the disbursements made by EU. 
 
5. THE WORKING OF FLEX  
This sub-section describes the working of FLEX over the period 2000-2007. By 
taking into account the countries which documented at least one drop in export 
earnings from 2000 to 2007, table 1 presents the figures regarding the shortfall of 
export earnings, the impact on public deficit (up to 2006) and the actual FLEX 
support. This information allows us to evaluate whether and to what extent ACP 
countries meet the first eligibility criterion relating to the relevance of the shock (first 
and second columns of data for each application year from 2000 to 2006) and the 
second condition regarding the impact on the public budget (third and fourth columns 
of data for each application year from 2000 to 2006). Furthermore, table 1 helps the 
understanding of other issues (for instance, the distribution across country and over 
time of the shocks and of the FLEX support, the financial coverage of FLEX) relating 
to the working of the EU facility. 
Given that the 2008 FLEX revision abolished the criterion relating to the 
impact on public deficit, the information available, at the time of writing, for the 
application year 2007 (Commission of the European Communities, 2009) regards the 
qualifying condition relating to the magnitude of the shock, and the FLEX support. 
For the sake of clarity, we present data in bold script if the eligibility criteria are met. 
Finally, in the last column of data, we report the effective FLEX support received by 
                                                                                                                               
be made in the latter half of the same year or, at the latest, at the beginning of year  N+2. 
Offsetting the amount disbursed against the next payment of budgetary support would then 
allow any over-payment (if final statistics show that the loss of export earnings was not as 
large as forecast) to be recovered at a later date. each ACP economy for each year. For better interpretation and comparison of the 
results from 2000 to 2007, it is necessary to bear in mind:  
(a)  the 2004 and 2008 revisions, which, as has been pointed out, have 
changed the eligibility criteria ACPs have to meet in order to claim for 
FLEX support. 
(b)  the changes in the availability of financial resources for additional 
support. In this respect, it should be mentioned that additional funds 
have been allocated to set up an intra-ACP FLEX programme of EUR 
50 million for 2006 (application year 2005) and of EUR 50 million for 
2007 (application year 2006). From application year 2007 on, the 
amount of FLEX support available will be EUR 80-100 million for each 
year
29 and “this amount corresponds to a coverage of about 35% to 45% 
of estimated effective needs of the application years 2004-2005-2006” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007). 
 
The instability of ACP export earnings 
The first question to be addressed is the relevance of short-term instability in ACP 
export earnings. Do ACPs suffer as a result of export side shocks? How much do they 
suffer? What is the distribution of export shocks across ACP countries and over time?  
An initial response is given by the number of countries that report statistics on 
export earnings in order to apply for FLEX support: they number 47 out of 78 ACP 
states
30 and therefore there are 31 countries whose exports do not show a significant 
negative deviation from the reference value for each year of the period under 
scrutiny.
31 
Some other insights may be obtained by looking at the distribution of shocks 
across countries and years. Within the group of countries reporting at least one 
                                             
29 As is stated in the Decision N°1 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 25 May 2007, these 
additional funds are for “ensuring minimal support to those countries subject to the adverse 
effects of instability in export earnings regardless of the level of the uncommitted balances 
under their national B-envelopes before the end-of-term review reallocation decision 
entered into force”. 
30 Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cook Islands, Ivory Coast, Dom. Republic, Dominica, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Grenada, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Prince, Samoa, Senegal, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Vincent/ Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Uganda, Vanuatu, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
31 This result has been interpreted cautiously because our data refer only to countries which 
present statistics in order to apply for FLEX support. However, if on one hand it is not 
possible to know from this dataset whether there are other ACPs suffering from drops in 
export earnings, on the other hand, it is reasonable to argue that the group not claiming FLEX 
support includes countries which might have experienced just a small shortfall in export 
earnings. Indeed, had the shock been large in magnitude (i.e., the exports showed a significant 
negative deviation from the reference value), the ACP would have an incentive to report the 
exports statistics and, therefore, apply for additional FLEX support. shortfall in exports, there are 12 economies whose exports show a negative deviation 
from the trend for just one year.
32 5 ACPs suffered a shock in export earnings for two 
different years, whereas the number of ACPs affected by export shocks for three years 
is 9.
33 Only 11 out of the 47 shock-suffering ACPs register a drop in exports for more 
than four years. To be more precise, Dominica and Malawi suffered from export 
shocks in 7 years over the period 2000-2007, Guyana, Ivory Coast and St. Lucia in 6 
out 8 years and 6 economies (Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Mali and Zimbabwe) recorded a shock in 5 out of 8 years (Table 1). 
From the data reported in Table 1, it is also possible to point out that export 
earnings instability exhibits some differences from one year to another. From 2000 to 
2007 the total number of documented reductions of ACP exports was 151. The year 
with the maximum number (27) of shocks was 2003 whereas the minimum was 14 in 
2005 (see also Table 2).  
According to the above discussion, it is reasonable to argue that  
(a) export earnings instability appears to be an issue for a restricted number of 
ACPs and 
(b) the frequency of shocks by country indicates that only in a few cases do 
exports show regular negative deviations from the reference value.  
The majority of ACPs register temporary shortfalls in exports earnings, and it is these 
that FLEX aims to deal with. 
 
On the eligibility criteria  
Data reported in Table 2 summarise the working of FLEX. As said above, the 
total number of shortfalls occurring from 2000 to 2007 was 151, and 123 of them 
were higher than the fluctuation threshold fixed with the first eligibility criterion. As 
reported in table 2, the first eligibility criterion has not been a serious obstacle for 
ACPs wishing to gain access to FLEX assistance. Indeed, the fulfilment rate of this 
qualifying condition is high in every year of the period under scrutiny: from 2000 to 
2006, the minimum value of the fulfilment rate was 77.8%, in 2000, while, in 2002, 
all 19 shocks satisfied the FLEX constraint. The same applies for 2006 when 16 
shocks met the qualifying criterion. In 2007, 4 out of 18 shocks were higher than the 
imposed threshold. All this evidence widely supports the 2008 ACP-EU decision to 
maintain 10% (2% for LDCs) as the fluctuation threshold to apply for FLEX support. 
With regards to the impact on ACP public deficit caused by drops in exports, it 
is cogent to distinguish between the different phases which have characterised the 
FLEX since 2000. It is possible to identify two sub-periods from 2000 to 2006. The 
                                             
32 Antigua and Barbuda (in 2003), Botswana (in 2003), Burkina Faso (in 2002), Cook Islands  
(in 2007), Eritrea (in 2003), Fiji (in 2004), Jamaica (in 2003), Mozambique (in 2002), Papua 
New Guinea (in 2003), Senegal (in 2003), Suriname (in 2002) and Zambia (in 2000) (Table 
1). 
33 Countries suffering an export earnings shortfall in two years: Chad, Ghana, Rwanda, 
St.Vincent/Grenadines and Sudan. Countries suffering a shortfall in export earnings in three 
years: Belize, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Sao Tome and Prince, Samoa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania and Tonga (Table 1).  first phase regards the application years 2000-2002, where the FLEX operating rules 
were those established when the facility was first applied. The second phase covers 
the application years 2003-2006 subsequent to the 2004 FLEX revision. Finally, a 
new phase started in 2007 with the revision made in 2008.  
Table 2 reports the year-by-year number of requests which fulfilled both 
FLEX eligibility criteria (line C, table 2) and the budget–admitting rate, determined as 
the ratio between the number of requests which fulfilled criteria 1 and the number of 
requests satisfying both eligibility criteria. When this ratio is close to unity then it is 
possible to argue that the qualifying criterion related to the impact on public deficit 
does not impede ACP access FLEX support, given a “sizable” shock on exports side.  
As outlined above, at the beginning of the period, an ACP might apply for 
FLEX support if an exogenous shock resulted in a 10% worsening (2% for LDCs) in 
public deficit. This threshold greatly restricted the number of ACPs eligible for 
compensation: the rejection rate was, on average, 75% from 2000 to 2002 (only 10 
out of 40 requests satisfied the second criterion, given that the first criterion was 
fulfilled), with a peak of 84.2% in 2002. This condition was an obstacle for ACPs in 
their attempts to become eligible for FLEX support and the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers intervened twice in this respect: as mentioned above (cfr § 1.3.2), the 
threshold was reduced from 10% to 2% in 2004 and removed completely in 2008. 
The 2004 FLEX revision introduced the second phase of FLEX (application 
years 2003-2006) and translated into an increase in the number of requests satisfying 
the public deficit condition. In fact, during this period there were 69 requests for 
FLEX support which fulfilled the first qualifying condition and among these 53 
requests also met the second eligibility requirement. Thus, from 2003 to 2006, the 
budget-admitting rate was, on average, 76.84% (=53/69*100) and the annual rates 
were as follows: 68% in 2003, 81.3% in 2004, 91.7% in 2005 and 75% in 2006 (Table 
2). 
If, on the one hand, the increase in the budget-admitting rate was expected 
given the 2004 Flex revision, on the other hand, the EU and the ACPs decided to 
eliminate the second eligibility criterion in 2008 (some arguments in favour of this 
removal are discussed in § 1.3.2). The new operating rules came into play in the 
application year 2007. 
 
Actual Flex Compensation 
This section focuses on FLEX payments made during the period 2000-2007. From 
2000 to 2007, the total number of FLEX payments was 56 and their distribution over 
time reflects:  
(a) the 2004 and 2008 changes in the facility operating rules and  
(b) the increase in financial resources.  
In the first three years of the period, there were 10 requests satisfying both 
eligibility criteria and the corresponding total theoretical assistance was 180.75 MLN 
Euro (Table 2). Against this, the EU admitted 8 compensation payments with an 
availability of resources of 35.65 MLN Euro. Thus, the financial coverage in the first 
phase of FLEX was low (20.8% in 2000, 16.5% in 2002 and 34.4% in 2002). This 
difference between the potential support and the effective disbursement depended on 
the availability of resources which were limited according to the amount of funds in the Country B-Envelopes.  
In this respect, the facts do not change when the second phase of FLEX (years 
2003-2006) is considered. While the total amount of financial assistance determined 
by those shortfalls in export earnings which were considered eligible for FLEX 
support was 869,3 MLN Euro, the actual declared transfers amounted to 196,01 MLN 
Euro. Hence, from 2003 to 2006, the average percentage of financial coverage was 
20.73%, that is to say FLEX compensated for slightly more than one fifth of 
worsening ACP public deficit as a consequence of export shocks. On an yearly basis, 
the financial resources available totalled 81,51 MLN EURO in 2003, 28,3% of the 
assistance required that year (287,75 MLN Euro), while, in 2004, the availability of 
finance was low (10,61 MLN Euro), that is to say 6.3% of the amount theoretically 
required for support (167,6 MLN Euro). The available resources increased, 
respectively, to 50 in 2005 and 53,89 MLN Euro in 2006,
34 while the requests for 
compensation amounted to 188 MLN Euro in 2005 and 217 MLN Euro in 2006. This 
evidence indicates that relaxing the qualifying criteria increased the frequency of 
eligible requests, but the amount of finance was still too low to give ACPs adequate 
assistance, despite the significant increase of financial resources in 2005 and 2006.  
With regards 2007, data on the theoretical amount of FLEX support 
determined by 2008 FLEX revision are not available country-by-country, but the 4 
ACP countries (Burundi, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, St Kitts/Grenadines, see table 
1) admitted for FLEX support receive 24,52 MLN Euro in assistance, a value of 
resources which is significantly lower than that (80-100 MLN Euro) available as a 
maximum annual FLEX allocation for all ACP countries. 
When analysing payments at individual country level, it emerges that there 
were 28 beneficiaries. 10 of these
35 received financial assistance in 3 out of 8 years, 
eight ACPs benefited from FLEX support for 2 years,
36 while 10 ACPs received only 
one payment
37 (Table 1). 
The distribution of transfers by country is quite concentrated. The Ivory Coast 
has been the major beneficiary of FLEX, with 42,54 MLN Euro in financial support 
(16.61% of the total). The top five beneficiaries (Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Mauritania, 
Papua New Guinea and Swaziland) accounted for more than 50% of the total. At the 
opposite end of the scale, there are 10 ACPs (Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, Fiji, 
Samoa, Jamaica, Gambia, Vanuatu, Comoros, Mali, Tonga and) which individually 
received less than 1% and which, together, account for less than 7% of total FLEX 
                                             
34 Data include the 3,99 MLN of Euro allocated among 10 ACP countries (Benin, Comoros, 
Ivory Coast, Dominica, Madagascar, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent/Grenadines, 
Swaziland and Tonga) to top up their FLEX amounts for the application year 2006 by 
increasing the existing B-envelope allocation. This topping up results from differences 
between initial allocations based on provisional export data and corrected allocation based on 
final export data (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). 
35 Burundi, Comoros, Dominica, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Mauritius and St. Lucia.   
36 Benin, Central African Republic, Grenada, Madagascar, Samoa, St. Vincent/Gren., 
Solomon Islands and St. Kitts and Nevis.  
37 Botswana, Fiji, Gambia, Jamaica, Mali, Papua New Guinea, Swaziland, Tonga, Vanuatu 
and Zambia. transfers. Table 3 also presents the amount of FLEX support pro capita and the GDP 
pro capita, both expressed as geometric averages over the 1998-2007 period. It 
emerges that, in relative terms, the major five beneficiaries of FLEX were Dominica 
(81 Euro pro capita), St. Vincent (44.4), Saint Lucia (33.4), Mauritius (26.2) and 
Grenada (22.9), which, in the distribution of GPD pro capita (column 5), are above 
the average level of GDP pro capita for FLEX beneficiaries. Another point of interest 
is the fact that the correlation between FLEX pro capita (column 4) and GDP pro 
capita (column 5)  is 0.6 (Table 3). 
The date of FLEX disbursements   
Some final considerations can be made by looking at payments made by the EU in 
favour of ACPs and the dates of these disbursements. Table 4 presents the payments 
by individual country, a summary of which is reported in the last three rows of table 
2. Three key results emerge from the data.  
The first finding refers to the time-lag between the shortfall year and the 
period when the payment is made. In fact, it takes, on average, about 4 years to make 
a payment: the first FLEX payment was made in 2004 to provide additional support 
for Zambia’s worsening public deficit due to an export shock registered in 2000. In 
2005, Guyana received support for shocks experienced in 2000 and 2001. This delay 
in payment also regards more recent application years. No disbursement has yet been 
made for the application year 2006, while, during the first months of 2009, the EU 
disbursed 4 out of 11 requests of additional support for losses experienced in 2005. 
This time-lag is similar to that associated to the other two main compensatory 
financing facilities (the CFF of the IMF and the EU’s Stabex). Indeed, the time-lag for 
disbursements was, on average, about 4 years (Aiello 1999a,1999b; Lim 1991, 
Herrmann et al, 1993) during the period when these two facilities were intensively 
used by eligible countries. While the delay in FLEX payments is not easy to 
understand given the massive use of modern technology and numerous improvements 
in bureaucracy, it ought to be remembered that the fact that (a) FLEX only became 
operational in 2003, with the application of the Cotonou Agreement and of the 9th 
EDF, and (b) the decision to assign 50 Million Euro to the application years 2005 and 
2006 dated from 2007, once guarantees were obtained on the availability of funds. 
With the current FLEX some improvements in respect to the speed of support are 
expected. Indeed, the extension of advance payments to 100%, for ACPs eligible for 
budgetary support, (see § 1.3.2) should also have an impact with regards the attempt 
to guarantee rapid disbursements. Indeed the fact that, already at the time of writing, 
requests relative to application year 2007 have been processed and resources have 
been committed (Table 1) is a positive initial signal in this direction. 
The second result is that many of the declared payments have not actually 
been made yet. 34 of the 56 accepted requests are still unpaid. In particular, 3 requests 
of 2003 still wait for support and many others (for instance, 7 for 2005 and 12 for 
2006) have experienced a significant delay of 3-4 years. There are even 2 requests for 
2000-2001 and 6 for 2003 which are still to be disbursed (Tables 2 and 4).  
The conclusion is that the total value of FLEX payments effectively made 
from 2000 to 2007 is just a limited proportion of the amount that the EU Commission 
decided to contribute in the form of support. This ratio between the requests for 
assistance which were accepted and the payments effectively made is clearly high 
when the early years of FLEX are considered (84% in 2000, 67,3% in 2001 and 59,5% in 2002). On the other hand, it stands at less than 40% when considering the 
application years 2003-2005. In brief, the total amount effectively paid since 2000 is 
81 MLN Euro, i.e. about 32% of the total amount (246,11 MLN Euro) which the EU 
accepted should be disbursed (Tables 2 and 4). 
6. DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNT 
The evaluation of FLEX may be made by comparing its actual workings with that 
which one would expect of an ideal effective facility. Given an export shortfall caused 
by an exogenous shock, it is reasonable to argue that FLEX can be considered 
effective when it provides rapid disbursements whose size is enough to allow ACP 
states to pursue the objectives as they are established in the ACP-EU agreement.
38 
Timely financing ensures that the scheme will be countercyclical and not pro-cyclical. 
In the past, the FLEX facility suffered from some constraints that greatly 
limited its impact. Despite FLEX only having been introduced in 2000, the ACPs-EU 
have paid a great deal of attention to simplifying the criteria that ACPs must meet to 
be eligible for support. As highlighted above, the changes in FLEX operating rules 
have resulted, as expected, in increasing the number of requests “admitted” for 
consideration for budgetary support. However, the ultimate aim of FLEX is not to 
increase the numbers of countries eligible for support, but to provide quick sizable 
payments intended to “safeguard socio-economic reforms and policies that could be 
affected negatively as a result of a drop in revenue and to remedy the adverse effects 
of instability of export earnings, in particular from agricultural and mining products”  
(Article 68(2) of the 2005 revised Cotonou agreement). 
The main lesson to be learnt from the experience of FLEX over the period 
2000-2007 is that this facility failed to achieve its objective mainly because of (a) lack 
of finance to be allocated to ACPs ;(b) delays in financing. 
The limited resources need further urgent attention for two reasons. First, 
FLEX is an important financing facility which many commodity dependent 
developing countries refer to when they experience a temporary exogenous shock in 
export earnings (as reported above, the other active facility dealing with export side 
shocks, the CFF of the IMF, has not been used since 2000).
39 Second, it would seem 
pointless to maintain a facility and work hard to guarantee that it functions well if, at 
the end of the selection process, the countries admitted did not receive any support 
because of the lack of finance. From the experience of FLEX since 2000 and looking 
at the total yearly assistance required by ACPs over the period 2000-2006 (see table 
2), it is reasonable to argue that the recommendation to address the issue of finance 
holds true despite the efforts made to raise the B-envelope to EUR 50million for the 
application years 2005 and 2006. However, data for the application year 2007 indicate 
                                             
38 “The purpose of support in cases of short term fluctuations in export earnings is to safeguard 
socio-economic reforms and policies that could be affected negatively as a result of a drop in 
revenue and to remedy the adverse effects of instability of export earnings, in particular from 
agricultural and mining products”  (Article 68(2) of the 2005 revised Cotonou agreement). 
39 It is worth noticing that the justification for the existence of FLEX ought to take into 
account not only the circumstances that ACPs refer to when they suffer from export shocks, 
but also the opportunity costs involved in maintaining the facility and the real needs it 
addresses.  that the demand for assistance is less than the finance (EUR 80-100 Million) available 
as an annual FLEX-Envelope. 
With regards to the second lesson from FLEX, that of its time delay in 
providing financial support, it is unquestionable that this is largely due to the fact that 
the facility operates on the basis of an ex-post rather than an real time mechanism. By 
referring to actual export earnings, FLEX incurs the delay associated with data 
recording, a process which takes a great deal of time. This holds true whatever the 
efforts of the EU Commission to collect, elaborate and validate export earnings data. 
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